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Preface
This report provides a detailed documentation on the application of static pro-
gram analysis to the key establishment protocols of the ZigBee wireless sensor
network standard. The approach presented in this report is within the scope of
the SENSORIA (Software Engineering for Service-Oriented Overlay Comput-
ers) project, and will form a preliminary version of one of the chapters in my
PhD dissertation. The discovered flaw and the proposed secure protocols were
recently published in a conference paper (see references [17]) and also accepted
for journal publication.
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Analyzing the Protocols
Computer networks or simply networks are the main means of information shar-
ing and communication in today’s IT infrastructure. Certain protocols are ex-
ecuted to facilitate communication in networks. However, such networks are
mostly insecure and the communication needs to be protected against attackers
that may influence network traffic and and communication parties that might
be either dishonest or compromised by attackers.
Cryptographic security protocols form an essential ingredient of network com-
munications by ensuring secure communication over insecure networks. These
protocols use cryptographic primitives to support certain security properties,
but ensuring this properties requires a lot more effort. Despite the relatively
small size of the security protocols it is very hard to design them correctly, and
their analysis is very complicated. One of the most well-known examples is the
Needham-Schroeder protocol [1], that was proven secure by using BAN logic
[2]. Seventeen years later G. Lowe [3, 4], found a flaw by using an automatic
tool FDR. The flaw was not detected in the original proof because of different
assumptions on the intruder model. The fact that this new attack had escaped
the attention of the experts was an indication of the underestimation of the
complexity of protocol analysis. This example has shown that protocol analysis
is critical for assessing the security of such cryptographic protocols.
In this report, we present our approach for protocol analysis together with a
real example where we find an important flow in a contemporary wireless sen-
sor network security protocol. We start by modelling protocols using a specific
process algebraic formalism called LySa process calculus. We then apply an
analysis based on a special program analysis technique called control flow anal-
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ysis. We apply this technique to the ZigBee-2007 End-to-End Application Key
Establishment Protocol and with the help of the analysis discover an unknown
flaw. Finally we suggest a fix for the protocol, and verify that the fix works by
using the same technique.
1.1 An Overview of the Analysis Method
Static program analysis, in essence, examines a program statically, before any
attempt of execution. Although the finite amount of resources may limit the
information or the answers to important questions, the approximation based
approach of static program analysis makes it preferable on the area of protocol
analysis. Instead of facing undecidability problem, this technique sacrifices pre-
cision and gives approximate answers about a property of a certain program,
or a piece of code, or a protocol as in our case. However, this loss of precision
does not mean that we are missing the flaws, it merely means that the analysis
results may include false positives, such as a bug or a flaw that the program
does not contain.
Static program analysis was originally developed for generating codes and opti-
mising compilers [5, 6]. Nevertheless, the analysis technique have recently been
directed to the field of security. Encouraging results have been obtained by the
use of this approach where safe approximations to the set of values or behaviours
arising during protocol runs can be predicted.
Control flow analysis of processes formalised in the LySa process calculus suc-
cessfully computes an over-approximation of the run-time behaviour of a proto-
col [7, 8]. This method is actually the protocol analysis method that we present
in this report. The roadmap of the analysis method is given in Fig. 1.1, and we
will present the steps of this roadmap in the following sections.
1.2 Modelling in LySa Process Calculus
The first step in the protocol analysis is to formalise the protocol narration into
a model that is suitable for the analysis. In our case, we formalize the protocols
using the LySa process calculus [8]. LySa is based on the π-calculus [9] and
incorporates cryptographic operations using ideas from the Spi-calculus [10].
However, LySa has two different properties compared to spi/π calculus. First,
LySa has one global ether, instead of channels. The reason for this difference is
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Figure 1.1: The Roadmap of the Analysis
Table 1.1: LySa Terms - Symmetric Fragment
E ::=
x variable
| n name
| {E1, . . . , Ek}
ℓ
E0
[destL ] symmetric encryption
that, in usual networking implementations (e.g. ethernet-based, wireless, etc.),
anyone can eavesdrop or act as an active attacker which does not correspond
to the channel-based communication. The second difference is in the pattern
matching usage in the tests of the expressions associated with input and decryp-
tion. Although LySa is a very powerful process calculus which also supports
asymmetric encryption, digital signatures, etc., in order to make it simple we
only illustrate the symmetric fragment. The symmetric fragment suffices to
prove our claims in the example that we will present the flaw discovery since
the protocol is designed for symmetric encryption only. The reader interested
in further details including the asymmetric fragment may refer to [8].
In LySa, we have terms (E) that consist of names (keys, nonces, messages,
etc.), variables, and the compositions of them using symmetric encryption. The
syntax of terms is shown in Table 1.1. In the case of encryption, the tuples of
terms E1, . . . , Ek are encrypted under a term E0 which actually represents an
encryption key. Note that an assumption of perfect cryptography is adopted,
which means that decryption with the correct key is the only inverse function
of encryption. The annotation inside brackets in the end of encryption will be
explained later in this section.
The syntax of the processes (P ) which is mostly alike to the polyadic Spi-
calculus [10] is shown in Table 1.2. At this point, we prefer to skip the syntax
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Table 1.2: LySa Processes - Symmetric Fragment
P ::=
0 nil
| P1 | P2 parallel comp.
| !P replication
| (ν n)P restriction
| 〈E1, . . . , Ek〉.P output
| (E1, . . . , Ej ;xj+1, . . . , xk).P input
| decrypt E as {E1, . . . , Ej ; xj+1, . . . , xk}
ℓ
E0
[origL ] inP symm. decryption
for simple ones in the table, but explain the more interested and complicated
two: output and input processes. The output process 〈E1, . . . , Ek〉.P sends the
k-tuple E1, . . . , Ek to the network and continues as process P . Similarly, the
input process (E1, . . . , Ej ;xj+1, . . . , xk).P receives a k-tuple E
′
1, . . . , E
′
k and if
conditions are satisfied, removes the k-tuple from the network. Here, the input
operation uses pattern matching which will only succeed if the prefix of the
input message matches the terms specified before the semi-colon. In a simple
manner, we can say that for some input E′ the input process (E;x).P means
that if E′ can be separated into two parts such that first part pairwise matches
to the values E, then the remaining part of the input will be bound to the
variables x. As you can see in Table 1.2, the number of tuples in E′ is k so that
this is the total number of tuples in E and x. This kind of pattern matching is
also used in decryption.
Example 1.a The example LySa code below is a new (created - restriction) en-
cryption key (K) followed by an output which includes three plaintext elements
(A, B, KA) and an encrypted element ({K}KA).
(ν K) 〈A,B,KA, {K}KA〉
Example 1.b The example LySa code below is an input that binds the last
two elements of the input to the variables xKA and x as long as the first two
elements are A and B.
(A,B;xKA, x)
Example 1.c The example LySa code below is a decryption that decrypts the
value bound to variable x using the encryption key bound to variable xKA and
binds the resulting plaintext value to the variable xK . Note that this decryption
always succeeds without any need of pattern matching, as long as the correct key
exists in the receiver.
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decrypt x as {; xK}xKA
In order to describe the message authentication intentions of the protocols, we
also have annotations for origin and destination. Encryptions can be annotated
with fixed labels called crypto-points that define their positions in the pro-
cess, and with assertions that specify the origin and destination of encrypted
messages. A crypto-point ℓ is an element of some set C and used when encryp-
tions/decryptions occur. The LySa term for encryption:
{E1, . . . , Ek}
ℓ
E0
[destL ]
means that the encryption happened at crypto-point ℓ and the assertion [dest
L] means that corresponding (valid) decryption is to happen at a crypto-point
that belongs to the set L such that L ⊆ C. Similarly, in the LySa term for
decryption:
decrypt E as {E1, . . . , Ej ; xj+1, . . . , xk}
ℓ
E0
[origL ] inP
[orig L] specifies the crypto-points L ⊆ C that E is allowed to have been en-
crypted.
Example 2 The example LySa code below is the composition of the three
separate parts in Example 1, and the necessary annotations in such a way
that now we have two separate processes running in parallel.
/* a */ (ν K) 〈A,B,KA, {K}
ℓA
KA
[dest {ℓB} ]〉.0
|
/* b */ (A,B;xKA, x).
/* c */ decrypt x as {; xK}
ℓB
xKA
[orig {ℓA} ] in .0
The example we constructed step by step is actually the LySa model of the
single-message protocol below:
1. A → B: KA, {K}KA
The upper part (line a) of the parallel composition is the code for principal A,
and the lower part (lines b and c) is for principal B. In this example, annotations
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Table 1.3: Extended Protocol Narration - Case 1
1. A → :A, TC, {TC, AppKey, B}KA
[dest TC]
1’. →TC :xinitiator , xTC , xmessage
[check xTC=TC]
1”. TC :decrypt xmessage as
{x′TC , xkeytype, xresponder}KA
[orig xA][check x
′
TC=TC, xkeytype=AppKey]
2. TC→ : [new LK]
TC, xinitiator ,
{xinitiator ,AppLK,xresponder ,TRUE,LK}KA
[dest xinitiator ]
2’. →A :yTC , yA, ymessage
[check yTC=TC, yA=A]
2”. A :decrypt ymessage as
{y′A, ykeytype, yB, ybool, yLK}KA
[orig TC][check y′A=A, ykeytype=AppLK]
[check yB=B, ybool=TRUE]
state that the encryption at crypto-point ℓA is intended to be decrypted only at
ℓB. In a corresponding manner, the decryption at ℓB should originate from the
encryption at ℓA.
1.2.1 Specifying Protocols in LySa
In the beginning, we have a protocol narration like the one in Table 1.7. Then
we extend the narration to specify the internal actions to be performed in prin-
cipals when receiving those messages. The reason for this kind of extension or
conversion is to completely state the actions internal to the principals, which
are normally left implicit in the narration of security protocols.
As an example, the extended protocol narration of (due to the lack of space)
the first two messages of Case 1 is given in Table 1.3. For each message in
the original protocol narration, we have an output message n and an input
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message n′ in the extended protocol narration. Input message n′ presents the
variable (those written in italics) bindings and necessary checks in the receiver
side. If a variable is a ciphertext and the receiver has the correct encryption
key, then we have another message (i.e. n′′) for each of those variables. In
addition, we explicitly write the internal actions as annotations between square
brackets, in order to bridge the gap between informal and formal specification
of the protocol. Note that when analysing protocols we add an extra message
to the end, where a principal attempts to communicate the other through the
new shared key, LK. For example, the message
1. B → A: {MSG}LK
does not change the protocol nor bring any (nor bring any additional cost to
the implementations), it is just a sample message that will be sent using the
new LK and thus it will ease the validation which is done by checking attackers
knowledge.
In the next phase, we convert the extended protocol narration into a LySa
model. We use the LySa syntax that we explained earlier in this section and
configure the necessary settings. As an example, a regular LySa model of the
protocol that we have used to demonstrate extended protocol conversion is given
in Table 1.4. Further details of specifying protocols in LySa are present in [8].
1.3 Static Program Analysis
Static Analysis is a formal method that enables the security analysis of crypto-
graphic communication protocols which are modelled as LySa processes. Mes-
sages communicated on the network are tracked with the possible values of
the variables in the protocol. Besides, the potential violations of the destina-
tion/origin annotations are also recorded. The aim of static analysis is to effi-
ciently compute the safe approximations to the behaviour of the models without
actually running them. In Fig. 1.2 we can see the approximation approach. In
general, it is impossible to compute the precise answer so we make a choice
between over-approximation and under-approximation. Static analysis over-
approximates the set of possible operations that the LySa process describes.
The nature of over-approximation may cause the analysis to investigate a trace
which is impossible at all. However, over-approximation is needed to make a
safe approximation since under-approximation could miss some traces.
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Table 1.4: LySa Model - Case 1
let X ⊆ N s.t. ⌊N⌋ = {1, 2, 3} in
(νi∈X KAi) (νj∈X KBj)
|i∈X |j∈X∪{0} !
1 〈Ai,TC , {TC ,AppKey , Bj}KAi [at a1 ij dest {tc1 ij} ]〉.
2’ (TC , Ai; yij).
2” decrypt yij as {Ai,AppLK , Bj ,TRUE ; xLK ij}KAi
[at a2 ij orig {tc2 ij} ] in
4’ (Bj , Ai; y2 ij).
4” decrypt y2 ij as {; xmsgij}xLK ij [at a4 ij orig {b4 ij} ] in 0
|
|j∈X |i∈X∪{0} !
3’ (TC , Bj ; zij).
3” decrypt zij as {Bj ,AppLK , Ai,FALSE ; yLK ij}KBj
[at b3 ij orig {tc3 ij} ] in
4 (νMSG ij) 〈Bj , Ai, {MSGij}yLK ij [at b4 ij dest {a4 ij} ]〉. 0
|
|i∈X∪{0} |j∈X∪{0} !
1’ (Ai,TC ; xij).
1” decrypt xij as {TC ,AppKey , Bj ; }KAi
[at tc1 ij orig {a1 ij} ] in
2 (ν LK ij) 〈TC , Ai, {Ai,AppLK , Bj ,TRUE ,LK ij}KAi
[at tc2 ij dest {a2 ij} ]〉.
3 〈TC , Bj , {Bj,AppLK , Ai,FALSE ,LK ij}KBj
[at tc3 ij dest {b3 ij} ]〉. 0
!"#$%&'((%)*+,'-)".
/%$0+1$.2$3'4+)5%.
64$%&'((%)*+,'-)".
!"+4$%1$.
Figure 1.2: Static Analysis
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1.3.1 Analysis Method
The static analysis we use in this study is specified as a Flow Logic [7, 8], which
is based on the control flow analysis and the data flow analysis techniques that
allow us to make it fully automatic [11].
Control flow analysis is a program analysis technique that is used to compute
approximations of the result of a program execution without running the pro-
gram. Such an analysis helps us in determining the sets of values that may be
generated by communication using a specific protocol, which is beneficial for
validating certain security properties. Especially when used in conjunction with
a model of possible malicious activity (i.e. attacker), the analysis provides a
safe approximation of all events that may happen.
Flow Logic is a notational style for specifying analyses across programming
paradigms, introduced by Nielson, Nielson [12, 13, 14], and with Hankin [11].
By abstracting from domain specific formalisms and instead using standard
mathematical notations, the Flow Logic constitutes a meta-language that can
present an analysis without requiring additional knowledge about particular for-
malisms. Deriving an analysis estimate from the resulting analysis specification
is then left as a separate activity, usually involving orthogonal considerations
and tools. This approach allows the designer to focus on the specification of
analyses without making compromises dictated by implementation considera-
tions. Similarly, implementation is simplified and improved, as the implementer
is always free to choose the best available tool. In the next sections, we will
present control flow analysis of LySa in the style of flow logic.
The control flow analysis that we use in protocol analysis is specified using the
flow logic framework as a predicate
ρ, κ, ψ |= P
that holds precisely when ρ, κ, and ψ form an analysis result that correctly
describes the behaviour of the process P .
The main components of the analysis are:
• The variable environment ρ, an over-approximation of the potential values
of each variable that it may be bound to.
• The network component κ, an over-approximation of the set of messages
that can be communicated over the network.
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Table 1.5: Analysis for Terms, ρ |= E:ϑ
(AName)
⌊n⌋ ∈ ϑ
ρ |= n:ϑ
(AVar)
ρ(⌊x⌋) ⊆ ϑ
ρ |= x:ϑ
(AEnc)
∧ki=0ρ |= Ei:ϑi ∧
∀V0, V1, . . . , Vk: ∧
k
i=0 Vi ∈ ϑi ⇒ {V1, . . . , Vk}
ℓ
V0
[destL ] ∈ ϑ
ρ |= {E1, . . . , Ek}
ℓ
E0
[destL ]:ϑ
• The error component ψ, the set of error messages in the form (ℓ, ℓ′), in-
dicating that something encrypted at ℓ was unexpectedly decrypted at
ℓ′.
The analysis is judgments of the form ρ, κ, ψ |= P which express that ρ, κ, ψ
compose a valid analysis for the process P . We also need to introduce the
auxiliary judgment ρ |= E:ϑ at this point. This expresses that ϑ, the set of
values, is an acceptable estimate of the values that the term E may evaluate in
ρ, the abstract environment.
To keep the analysis component finite, we partition all the names that are
generated by a LySa process into finitely many equivalence classes. A canonical
value is a representative for each of these equivalence classes. Names from the
same equivalence class are assigned a common canonical name and instead of
the actual names, we use the names of those equivalence classes. For example,
the canonical representative of a name n is denoted by ⌊n⌋. Since it allows
us to analyse an infinite number of principals, canonical value is an important
analysis element [15].
The analysis of terms is listed in Table 1.5. The rule for analysing names
(AName) states that ϑ is an acceptable estimate for a name n if the canonical
representative of n belongs to ϑ. The rule for analysing variables (AVar) states
that ϑ is an acceptable estimate for a variable x if it is a superset of ρ(⌊x⌋).
The rule for analysing symmetric encryption (AEnc) finds the set ϑi for each
term Ei, collects all k-tuples of values (V0, . . . , Vk) taken from ϑ0× . . .×ϑk into
values of the form {V1, . . . , Vk}
ℓ
V0
[destL ] and requires that these values belong
to ϑ.
The analysis of processes is listed in Table 1.6. The idea of the analysis is very
similar to the analysis of terms, therefore instead of explaining all the rules we
explain only one interesting rule. The rule for analysing output (AOut) uses the
1.3 Static Program Analysis 11
Table 1.6: Analysis for Processes, (ρ, κ) |= P :ψ
(ANil) (ρ, κ) |= 0:ψ
(APar)
(ρ, κ) |= P1:ψ ∧ (ρ, κ) |= P2:ψ
(ρ, κ) |= P1 | P2:ψ
(ARep)
(ρ, κ) |= P :ψ
(ρ, κ) |= !P :ψ
(ANew)
(ρ, κ) |= P :ψ
(ρ, κ) |= (ν n)P :ψ
(AOut)
∧ki=1ρ |= Ei:ϑi ∧
(ρ, κ) |= P :ψ
∀V1, . . . , Vk: ∧
k
i=1 Vi ∈ ϑi ⇒ 〈V1, . . . , Vk〉 ∈ κ ∧
(ρ, κ) |= 〈E1, . . . , Ek〉.P :ψ
(AIn)
∧kj=1ρ |= Ei:ϑi ∧
(ρ, κ) |= P :ψ
∀V1, . . . , Vk ∈ κ: ∧
k
j=1 Vi ∈ ϑi ⇒ ∧
k
i=j+1Vi ∈ ρ(⌊xi⌋) ∧
(ρ, κ) |= (E1, . . . , Ej ; xj+1, . . . , xk).P :ψ
(ADec)
ρ |= E:ϑ ∧
∀ ∧ji=0 ρ |= Ei:ϑi ∧
(ρ, κ) |= P :ψ
((ℓ /∈ L′ ∨ ℓ′ /∈ L) ⇒ (ℓ, ℓ′) ∈ ψ) ∧
∀{V1, . . . , Vk}
ℓ
V0
[destL ] ∈ ϑ: ∧ji=0 Vi ∈ ϑi ⇒ ∧
k
i=j+1Vi ∈ ρ(⌊xi⌋) ∧
(ρ, κ) |= decrypt E as {E1, . . . , Ej ; xj+1, . . . , xk}
ℓ′
E0
[origL ] inP :ψ
analysis for terms to find the estimate ϑi for each term Ei and requires that all
all k-tuples of values 〈V1, . . . , Vk〉 taken from ϑ1 × . . . × ϑk are in κ (i.e. they
may flow on the network). The rule also requires that the components ρ, κ, ψ
compose a valid analysis for process P .
Example 3 Static analysis of the LySa model given in Example 2 will lead to
the following results:
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〈A,B,KA, {K}
ℓA
KA
[dest ℓB ]〉 ∈ κ
KA ∈ ρ(xKA)
{K}ℓAKA[dest ℓB ] ∈ ρ(x)
K ∈ ρ(xK)
Looking at the results above, it is easy to see that the first line is related to line
a in Example 2. Likewise, next two lines derived from line b and the last line
derived from line c in Example 2. Note that, how the analysis works is not the
subject of this paper. Therefore, see [8] for how Example 2 leads to Example 3.
1.3.2 Attacker Model
In practice, network protocols are vulnerable to attacks. Unfortunately it is
even easier to attack wireless networks since any computer within range that is
equipped with a wireless client card can pull the signal and access the data. In
this study, LySa processes are analysed in parallel with the Dolev-Yao attacker
[16]. The operations that this attacker model can perform are listed below, but
before this we have to introduce new canonical (see Section 1.3.1) names and
variables for the attacker. All the canonical names of the attacker are mapped
to n• and all the canonical variables of the attacker are mapped to z•. We also
have ℓ• which is a crypto-point in the attacker.
The descriptions of the Dolev-Yao conditions are:
• The attacker initially has the knowledge of the canonical name n• and
all free names of the process P but he can improve his knowledge by
eavesdropping on all messages sent on the network.
• The attacker can improve his knowledge by decrypting messages with the
keys he already knows. Unless the intended recipient of the message was
an attacker, an error (ℓ,ℓ•) should be added to the error component ψ
which means that something encrypted at ℓ was actually decrypted by the
attacker at ℓ•.
• The attacker can construct new encryptions using the keys he already
knows. If this message is received and decrypted by a principal, then an
error (ℓ•,ℓ) should be added to the error component ψ which means that
something encrypted at the attacker was decrypted by the attacker by a
process P at ℓ.
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• The attacker can send messages on the network using his knowledge and
thus forge new communications.
These conditions enable the attacker to establish scenarios including eavesdrop-
ping, modification, man-in-the-middle and replay attacks. The soundness of the
Dolev-Yao condition is proved in [8].
As shown in Fig. 1.1, the LySa model of a protocol is analysed in parallel with
the attacker model and processed by the LySa-tool (see Section 1.4.4) which
implements the static analysis. The results of the analysis are used to validate
destination/origin authentication and confidentiality properties of the protocols.
If no violation is detected, namely the error component ψ is empty, then it
is guaranteed that the protocol satisfies the destination/origin authentication
properties. Furthermore, the potential values that are learned by the attacker
help us in validating the confidentiality properties. The details as well as the
proof of the soundness of the analysis are presented in [7].
Example 4 In Example 3, we analysed Example 2 in an attack-free setting.
Now we add the attacker model and get the following results in addition to the
results in Example 3. Since the attacker is able to learn everything sent on the
network we have:
KA, {K}
ℓA
KA
[dest ℓB ] ∈ ρ(z•)
Therefore, the attacker can decrypt the encrypted part of the message which
leads to the violation:
(ℓA, ℓ•) ∈ ψ
Thus we conclude that the encryption at crypto-point ℓA which was intended
to be decrypted at ℓB can be decrypted by the attacker and hence the example
protocol is flawed.
1.4 Application on ZigBee Wireless Sensor net-
works
In this section, we present an application of the analysis method that we ex-
plained up to now [17]. This application has many features that make it in-
teresting. First of all, it pinpoints an undiscovered and non-trivial flaw in a
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real cryptographic security protocol. Another key issue is that the protocol is
being used in one of the latest wireless sensor network standards, ZigBee, that
is promising and emerging in the sensor networks field. Therefore, the protocol
includes secure components that are known to be secure when they are indi-
vidually used and some of them are industry standards such as SKKE that we
will explain in more details. Still we show that combining proven to be secure
components is not sufficient for guaranteeing security properties. Last feature
of this application is that we not only use protocol analysis to discover flaws but
also to verify our fix proposals.
1.4.1 ZigBee-2007 End-to-End Application Key Establish-
ment Protocol
ZigBee is a fairly new but promising Wireless Personal Area network (WPAN)
standard for wireless sensor networks that have very low resource requirements.
In parallel with this, the devices that operate in ZigBee networks have limited
resources in terms of memory, processor, storage, power, etc. Therefore imple-
menting the security guarantees is a great challenge and the verification of the
security properties is of paramount importance.
We start by presenting the key points that are necessary for a clear under-
standing of the development, and we omit all the details which are not directly
relevant to this study. However, a detailed survey on ZigBee security can be
suggested as [18] and surely the ultimate source is the ZigBee documentation
[20, 21, 22, 23, 19] which is a rather difficult read with hundreds of pages in-
cluding references to several other standards.
End-to-End Application Key Establishment is the protocol to be used when es-
tablishing a Link Key (LK) between two ZigBee devices, which are running in
High Security Mode (which was called Commercial Mode in the previous stan-
dard, ZigBee-2006 [24]). We will call the devices as initiator (A) and responder
(B). Note that there is also a Trust Center (TC), which shares a pairwise secret
key with each principal in the network. TC is actually an application that runs
on a preferably more powerful ZigBee device referred to as ZigBee Coordinator
which is unique in the network; whereas the remaining devices might be of type
ZigBee Router or ZigBee End Device, as shown in Fig. 1.3. For a better under-
standing we should mention that for two ZigBee devices to establish a secure
communication, they must share a symmetric key (LK) which they either receive
from a trusted server (TC) or create mutually using a temporary key received
from the trusted server.
The scenarios of End-to-End Application Key Establishment are visualized in
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Figure 1.3: ZigBee Network Model
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Figure 1.4: ZigBee-2007 End-to-End Application Key Establishment Scenarios
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Fig. 1.4. The solid lines represent the already secure communication paths,
labeled by corresponding symmetric encryption keys. The dashed lines represent
the resulting secure communication paths after a successful protocol run, again
labeled by corresponding encryption keys. Finally, the dotted lines are the
messages in the protocol labeled by their sequence numbers and the encryption
keys they deliver.
ZigBee-2007 End-to-End Application Key Establishment Protocol has two dif-
ferent cases according to the configuration of TC, we will call them as Case 1
and Case 2. In Case 1, TC creates the LK itself and sends it to each principal.
Therefore, the initiator and the responder have no role in the creation of the LK.
In Case 2, TC creates a temporary shared key called Master Key (MK) and
sends it to each principal. Using this MK, A and B initiate a Symmetric-Key
Key Establishment (SKKE) procedure to establish an LK. This case allows
principals to create an LK mutually. SKKE is actually a key agreement scheme
employed in the ZigBee End-to-End Application Key Establishment mechanism,
and its components are defined in the ANSI X9.63-2001 standard [25]. At the
end of (a successful run of) either case, two ZigBee devices will be able to
establish secure communication using their pairwise encryption key, LK.
1.4.1.1 Case 1
In Case 1, the initiator begins the procedure of establishing an LK with the
responder by sending TC the first message, request key, which includes desti-
nation address (=TC), requested key type (=Application Key), and partner address
(=B). Then TC creates an LK for two principals, and sends it to each principal
in two similar transport key messages. Since TC is configured to send an LK
directly in this case, the key type value in the last two messages will be Appli-
cation Link Key (AppLK). The only difference between these two messages is a
boolean value that indicates the initiator (TRUE: message recipient is the initia-
tor, FALSE: message recipient is the responder), and also the principal address’.
All the messages in this case are encrypted with the sender/receiver principal’s
key that is shared with TC (assuming that the security suite is Encryption-
only). The type of this key can either be Trust Center Link Key (TCLK) or
Trust Center Master Key (TCMK), as defined in the ZigBee specification [20],
but for simplicity we will call it KA for principal A, and KB for principal B.
The protocol narration of Case 1 is given in Table 1.7.
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Table 1.7: Protocol Narration - Case 1
1. A→TC: {TC, AppKey, B}KA
2. TC→A: {A, AppLK, B, TRUE, LK}KA
3. TC→B: {B, AppLK, A, FALSE, LK}KB
Table 1.8: Protocol Narration - Case 2
1. A→TC: {TC, AppKey, B}KA
2. TC→A: {A, AppMK, B, TRUE, MK}KA
3. TC→B: {B, AppMK, A, FALSE, MK}KB
4. A→B: {B, FALSE, Zero, SKKE}MK
5. B→A: {A, TRUE}MK
6. A→B: {NA}MK
7. B→A: {NB}MK
8. A→B: MAC{3,A,B,NA,NB}H(MAC{A,B,NA,NB}MK,1)
9. B→A: MAC{2,B,A,NB,NA}H(MAC{A,B,NA,NB}MK,1)
1.4.1.2 Case 2
In Case 2, the first three messages are almost the same as in Case 1, except in
this case TC is configured to send MK, and therefore key type is the Application
Master Key (AppMK). The rest of the messages are between the initiator and
the responder. In the fourth message, establish key, A sends B his request to
start SKKE. The values, False and Zero, indicate that there is no parent (router,
TC, etc.), and no parent address, respectively. The fifth message is the response
of B to A’s SKKE request. Note that these two messages are encrypted by MK,
which was received in the previous two messages. The remaining four messages
are actually the SKKE protocol itself. Messages 6 and 7 include the challenges
(NA, NB) of the principals. Messages 8 and 9 are the complex messages which
can be computed by both parties to verify each other. A and B create two mes-
sage authentication codes (MAC) using their knowledge, besides the MAC key
itself is a hash (H) of another MAC which they produce using the same knowl-
edge [26]. After the verification, the new LK will be H(MAC{A,B,NA,NB}MK ,
2), which is a minor variation of the MAC key that was used in the last two
messages. The protocol narration of Case 2 is given in Table 1.8.
1.4.2 The Flaw
In wireless networks, it is easy to intercept, forge and inject messages. Without
any formal analysis, an experienced eye can see that all the messages in ZigBee-
18 Analyzing the Protocols
2007 End-to-End Application Key Establishment Protocol can be replayed when
the same long-term encryption keys (KA, KB) are still being used. The reason
is the lack of freshness elements like nonces, timestamps, etc. This flaw can lead
to serious replay attacks, denial of service (DoS) attacks, etc. Even worse, when
an old session key is compromised, an attacker can decrypt all the messages
by replaying that old session key. In other words, lack of freshness can cause
failures in authenticity (in the case that principals accept an old session key
from a rogue TC) and confidentiality (in the case that principals start using a
compromised session key).
As can be seen in the narration of the protocol, no freshness indicator is used
in the distribution of either LK (in Case 1) or MK (in Case 2, the first three
messages). Therefore, all the messages can be replayed. Replay of a message
that includes a key is very critical. An attacker can store a message including
a key from a previous run of this protocol, and then send the old message to
make principals communicate using this old key. If the old key is compromised,
then the attacker will be able to decrypt all the messages between two victim
principals.
The significance of the security risk that is caused by this flaw may require more
explanation. Indeed, the flaw does not disclose any session key but allow reuse of
a former key. Besides, brute force attacks or other types of known cryptographic
attacks for obtaining the key do not seem practical for the current specification
(i.e. the keys are 128-bits). However, disclosure of a key might still be possible
without dealing with cryptography, and reuse of an old session key can cause
serious risks. An example scenario is given below:
Scenario 1 A and B established a link key, and had secure communication
with the help of that pairwise key. Than B left the network and disclosed the
key, which might be by means of hardware (e.g. local key extraction from the
chipset such as connecting a debugger, erasing the chip, then freely reading the
contents of RAM), or software (e.g. a bug in the implementation that discloses
the key after the session expires or terminates with the natural assumption that
a new session key will be used for a future session) defects. If B rejoins the
network, and run the key establishment protocol with A (no matter which case
or security level is chosen), the disclosed key may be replayed by the attacker
who can decrypt all the communication using the disclosed key.
In the ZigBee Specification, the notion of frame counter is emphasized as the
freshness protection. This approach is not a strong one for several reasons. First
of all, a frame counter uses incrementing values rather than random values and
rejects frames with a smaller counter value. Second, regardless of the length
(which is 32-bits in ZigBee) it is easy to cause overflow to frame counters. As
indicated in [27], if an adversary forges a frame with the maximum value (i.e.
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Table 1.9: Attack Scenario - Case 1
1. A→TC: {TC, AppKey, B}KA
2. TC→A: {A, AppLK, B, TRUE, LK}KA
3. TC→B: {B, AppLK, A, FALSE, LK}KB
1’. A→TC: {TC, AppKey, B}KA
2’. M(TC)→A: {A, AppLK, B, TRUE, LK}KA
3’. M(TC)→B: {B, AppLK, A, FALSE, LK}KB
0xFFFFFFFF ) any further frame will be rejected. In addition, using counters
is not a novel approach, since in such layered architectures lower layers also used
similar counters.
1.4.2.1 Flaw in Case 1
The attack scenario for Case 1 is given in Table 1.9. The first run (messages 1
to 3), is an old run which is intercepted by an attacker. Here, it is appropriate
to mention that LK is used like a session key and KA/KB are used like master
keys. Therefore, KA and KB are possibly the same in two different runs. The
second run in the attack scenario (messages 1’ to 3’) is initiated regularly, but
the last two messages are replayed by the attacker using the messages that are
captured from the old run. Furthermore, the attacker does not necessarily need
to wait for a message like 1’ since he can already replay it, too.
1.4.2.2 Flaw in Case 2
The attack for Case 1 is also possible for Case 2, in which MK is sent without
any freshness indicator. Even though LK is created mutually by the use of
SKKE in Case 2, a compromised old MK that is replayed to principals before
SKKE will allow an attacker to create the LK as well. The attack scenario for
Case 2 is given in Table 1.10. The first run (messages 1 to 9) is the old run and
it is sufficient for an attacker to capture messages 2 and 3. Then the attacker
replays these messages in the new run (messages 1’ to 9’). Although the nonce’s
used in SKKE (exchanged in messages 6 and 7) are different, as long as MK is
compromised the attacker can decrypt these messages and learn the nonces as
well. As a result, the attacker can still compute the new LK which is actually
H(MAC{A,B,NA’,NB’}MK , 2) (see Section 1.4.1). Therefore, we may conclude
that the flaw is critical in both cases.
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Table 1.10: Attack Scenario - Case 2
1. A→TC: {TC, AppKey, B}KA
2. TC→A: {A, AppMK, B, TRUE, MK}KA
3. TC→B: {B, AppMK, A, FALSE, MK}KB
4. A→B: {B, FALSE, Zero, SKKE}MK
5. B→A: {A, TRUE}MK
6. A→B: {NA}MK
7. B→A: {NB}MK
8. A→B: MAC{3,A,B,NA,NB}H(MAC{A,B,NA,NB}MK,1)
9. B→A: MAC{2,B,A,NB,NA}H(MAC{A,B,NA,NB}MK,1)
1’. A→TC: {TC, AppKey, B}KA
2’. M(TC)→A: {A, AppMK, B, TRUE, MK}KA
3’. M(TC)→B: {B, AppMK, A, FALSE, MK}KB
4’. A→B: {B, FALSE, Zero, SKKE}MK
5’. B→A: {A, TRUE}MK
6’. A→B: {NA’}MK
7’. B→A: {NB’}MK
8’.A→B:MAC{3,A,B,NA’,NB’}H(MAC{A,B,NA′,NB′}MK ,1)
9’.B→A:MAC{2,B,A,NB’,NA’}H(MAC{A,B,NA′,NB′}MK ,1)
1.4.3 Proposed Fixed Protocols
We propose fixed protocols that use nonces to ensure freshness of the messages
and at the same time the keys. We make use of the vital principles defined on
[28]. The narrations of our proposed solution are given in Table 1.11 and Table
1.12 for Case 1 and Case 2, respectively.
In Case 1, we added the nonce of the initiator (NA) to the first two messages.
This will ensure that when receiving the second message, A will believe that
she is communicating with the TC who knows her nonce and also her private
key. Note that message 1 can still be replayed but it will be ignored if A does
not verify message 2. We inserted two more messages before the last message,
so that we use nonces of the TC (NTC) and the responder (NB) to avoid
replay attacks. This will ensure that when receiving the fifth message, B will
believe that he is communicating with TC who knows his nonce. Also note that
message 3 can still be replayed but the process will be ignored if B does not
verify message 5.
Our solution is also applicable to the leaked MK problem in Case 2. Similar to
our solution for Case 1, we change the first three messages of Case 2 with five
messages that are also given in Table 1.12. Not to confuse with the nonces used
in SKKE, the nonces we added are called (preNA) and (preNB) in Case 2.
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Table 1.11: Proposed Fix - Case 1
1. A→TC: {TC, AppKey, B, NA}KA
2. TC→A: {A, AppLK, B, TRUE, NA, LK}KA
3. TC→B: {B, A, NTC}KB
4. B→TC: {TC, A, NTC, NB}KB
5. TC→B: {B, AppLK, A, FALSE, NB, LK}KB
Table 1.12: Proposed Fix - Case 2
1. A→TC: {TC, AppKey, B, preNA}KA
2. TC→A: {A, AppMK, B, TRUE, preNA, MK}KA
3. TC→B: {B, A, NTC}KB
4. B→TC: {TC, A, NTC, preNB}KB
5. TC→B: {B, AppMK, A, FALSE, preNB, MK}KB
6. A→B: {B, FALSE, Zero, SKKE}MK
7. B→A: {A, TRUE}MK
8. A→B: {NA}MK
9. B→A: {NB}MK
10. A→B: MAC{3,A,B,NA,NB}H(MAC{A,B,NA,NB}MK,1)
11. B→A: MAC{2,B,A,NB,NA}H(MAC{A,B,NA,NB}MK,1)
The fix that we propose is a mechanism that suffices to fix the flaws in the
original protocol. There might be other ways to fix, but this is a solution that
simply works and has proven (by formal verification) to be secure.
Obviously, the proposed solution would come at a particular cost. Particularly,
the number of messages in each protocol is increased by two, and the usage of
nonces are required. Transmission of more messages means more power con-
sumption, but for security critical applications (e.g. in Smart Energy, Com-
mercial Building Automation, etc.) this kind of fix which ensures that TC is
authenticated to both A and B (i.e. the new LK is not replayed) is necessary,
so the additional messages are inevitable. Besides the original protocol in Case
2 already has nine messages (whereas the primitive version, Case 1, only has
three), which is a proof that in order to have a sound protocol ZigBee may have
longer protocols for the same purpose. The usage of nonces is not a new cost
since it is already in SKKE which is employed by Case 2. However, the freshness
is preserved for only SKKE but not the protocol itself due to the design mistake
of the wrapping protocol.
As we mentioned before, the flaw in End-to-End Application Key Establishment
protocol may be visible to an experienced eye but to claim that a fix is flawless,
verification using formal methods is crucial. Static analysis with LySa is one of
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the methods that can be used, which has many advantages such as scalability
and the guarantee of termination.
1.4.4 Formal Verification Details
Analysing security protocols without any formal verification method is not a
reliable way to find flaws, nor to guarantee that there are no flaws. To make
our assertions and arguments sound, we use static analysis to analyse protocols.
To be finite, this method is computing over-approximations rather than exact
answers, and therefore may lead to false positives. However, when the analysis
results tell that the protocol is error-free, then it really is. In other words, no
simulation or verification is necessary when the protocols successfully passes
static analysis.
The base protocols in Section 1.4.1 are modelled using LySa process calculus
and analysed using the LySa-tool1. The result supports our claims in Section
1.4.2. The base protocols are prone to replay attacks which will cause serious
problems in the case of a leaking key.
The proposed protocols in Section 1.4.3 are also modelled analysed in the same
way with the base protocol. The result is successful, namely the proposed
protocols do not have any flaws.
The settings that we use to implement the LySa model and verify in the LySa-
tool are listed below:
• we check for the origin and destination addresses in each message (by
adding them as prefixes such as in IPv4 or IPv6)
• we have the necessary annotations for the encryptions and decryptions
• we allow legitimate attackers in addition to the illegitimate attackers (by
adding appropriate zero indices, namely attacker also shares master key
with TC)
• we model three groups of (infinite) principals so that we can model man-
in-the-middle attacks
• we add an extra message that is encrypted using the session key (to see
whether the compromised key can be used)
1http://www.imm.dtu.dk/English/Research/Language-Based
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• we check all the fields in the messages to have proper values (by pattern
matching), except session keys which are newly created (and bound to
variables in inputs)
To distinguish between old rounds and new rounds of the protocol we apply a
new technique in LySa. We add round indicators to the end of pattern-matched
fields in messages and match them in a smart way to distinguish old runs. Using
this technique, we can investigate replay attacks successfully.
1.5 Conclusion
Analysing protocols is not a trivial issue, and in this work we presented an
analysis method with a detailed application on a new and so called advanced
security protocol that uses secure components.
In this approach, we have solid benefits in mainly:
• solutions always exist and are computed in low polynomial time. This is an
important advantage because approaches based on model checking cannot
always guarantee termination, and besides prone to state space explosion
problem. Besides the analysis is correct with respect to formal operational
semantics, which may be hard to establish in different approaches such as
the ones based on modal logic of beliefs (BAN) where the completeness
property does not generally hold.
However, those benefits come with a particular cost:
• lack of trace and counter-example. Due to the nature of the analysis, there
is no trace and no produced counter-example to help flaw discovery. As
a result of the over-approximation, false positives may occur and manual
inspection is required to match the reported violations to actual flaws.
Another thing we have presented was the usage of protocol analysis in suggesting
a secured version of a flawed protocol. Fixing the flaws and proposing secure
protocols is another non-trivial job. In this manner, we made use of prudent
engineering practices of Gordon and Abadi, and benefited fruitful discussions
with Gavin Lowe. One of the points we emphasized was the importance of
freshness, and the importance of proper usage of freshness indicators such as
nonces, challenges, etc.
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We can recapitulate as encryption is not synonymous with security, and its
improper use can lead to errors. The proper use should be verified by protocol
analysis methods that focus on certain security properties. Along the way in this
study, we discovered and documented general guidelines about how to use static
analysis for protocol validation. We do believe that such studies are necessary
in order to standardise protocols that live up to their stated expectations.
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